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The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights has been
a very hot topic in the past few years. From the introduction of the PROTECT
IP Act of 2011 ("PlPA"),' to the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement,2 ("ACTA") to the recent U.S.-China dispute before the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"),3 the topic has dominated policy debates at both the do-
mestic and international levels. While most policymakers, industry representa-
tives, and commentators have recognized the critical importance of intellectual
* Copyright © 2012 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and Direc-
tor, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar Chair
Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Centre
for International Intellectual Property Studies, University of Strasbourg. This Lecture was
delivered as the Inaugural Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property Distinguished
Speaker in Intellectual Property Lecture at the University of New Hampshire School of Law
on April 14, 2011. An earlier version of this Lecture has also been presented as public semi-
nars in Melbourne and Sydney for the Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia.
The Author would like to thank John Broderick, Mary Wong, Megan Richardson, and Eliza-
beth Webster for their kind invitations and hospitality, and the participants of these events for
their valuable comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Linzey Erickson and Lind-
sey Purdy for excellent research and editorial assistance.
I S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
2 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available at http://
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i-property/pdfs/actal 105.en.pdf [hereinafter ACTA]. See
generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011) (criticizing the
use of the "country club" approach to negotiate ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now
Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (dis-
cussing the serious concerns about ACTA).
3 For detailed discussions of this dispute, see generally Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing
Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 727 (2011).
Volume 52- Number 3
IDEA-The Intellectual Property Law Review
property enforcement, there has been neither philosophical nor normative con-
sensus on the appropriate norms in this area. Like three blind men trying to
describe an elephant, different people have different conceptions of what en-
forcement comprises, which enforcement standards governments should imple-
ment, and how much these implementation efforts should cost.
Consider the title of this Lecture: "Enforcement, Enforcement, What
Enforcement?" By changing the punctuation marks, the title can be easily trans-
formed to reflect the different views held by four different groups of players.
The first group consists of foreign businessmen who are frustrated by the mas-
sive enforcement problems that they experience on the ground in developing
countries. "Whoa!" They lament. "These countries claim that they enforce
intellectual property rights. Enforcement! Enforcement! What enforcement are
they talking about? I don't see any enforcement at all."
The second group consists of frustrated government officials from de-
veloping countries who are inundated with demands from developed country
governments to strengthen the protection and enforcement of intellectual proper-
ty rights. These demands are often insensitive to local conditions and the li-
mited economic and technological developments on the ground. Even worse,
the demandeur countries have repeatedly overlooked the many costly and pain-
ful efforts that many developing country officials have undertaken to improve
their respective intellectual property systems. "Developed countries keep on
complaining about our lack of enforcement," these officials implore. "En-
forcement! Enforcement! What enforcement are they talking about?! They just
want us to raise the enforcement levels so high that we subsidize their indus-
tries. Those levels are not even required by the WTO."
A third group consists of government officials from developing coun-
tries who have very limited knowledge about a new, new thing called "intellec-
tual property." They do not have sufficient knowledge about the complex and
highly technical intellectual property standards. Nor do they have the expe-
rience needed to design an intellectual property system tailored specifically to
their country's local conditions. Bewildered, they ask, "Enforcement? ... En-
forcement? ... What enforcement are we talking about? What type of stan-
dards do we need? What are the benefits and drawbacks?"
The final group consists of inquisitive professors who are trying to de-
velop a better understanding of the various requirements of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' ("TRIPS Agreement") as
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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well as ways to design an optimal, yet effective, intellectual property enforce-
ment system. "Enforcement? Enforcement?", these academics ask in a philo-
sophical manner. "Hmm .... What type of enforcement system would be op-
timal? How high should the standards be? What costs would be acceptable?
How should rights be balanced against countervailing responsibilities?"
This Lecture focuses on the enforcement challenges confronting devel-
oped countries and their intellectual property industries. Unlike some of my
previous works,' the focus of this Lecture is not about recalibrating the balance
in the international intellectual property system. Instead of taking a pro-
development perspective, this Lecture explores ways to provide more meaning-
ful protection to intellectual property rights holders in both developed and de-
veloping countries.
Part I outlines three different types of common enforcement challenges:
(1) cross-border enforcement; (2) digital enforcement; and (3) transborder en-
forcement. Part II examines one recent effort to address these challenges: the
development of ACTA, a highly controversial agreement that seeks to set a new
and higher benchmark for intellectual property enforcement among like-minded
countries. This Part further explores why that Agreement is unlikely to provide
stronger global enforcement of intellectual property rights. In view of the many
flaws inherent in ACTA, Part m suggests four guiding principles that can be
used to develop a better and more effective intellectual property enforcement
treaty. Part IV concludes with four alternative enforcement strategies that poli-
cymakers can use to supplement or substitute the treaty-based approach.
I. TYPES OF ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
A. Cross-Border Challenges
For as long as the WTO has existed, the enforcement of intellectual
property rights has been a major challenge for both developed and developing
countries. As early as the time when the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated,
countries disagreed vehemently over the levels of enforcement that should be
included as part of the Agreement's minimum standards.' While adequate en-
forcement is essential to the effective operation of the intellectual property sys-
5 See, e.g., Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 2; Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note
2; Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369 (2006).
6 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 492-99 (2011)
(discussing the enforcement-related negotiation challenges).
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tem, higher enforcement standards often come with a hefty price tag, difficult
tradeoffs,' and significant intrusions on national sovereignty.'
To strike a balance in the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries de-
manded the adoption of Article 41.5,' which explicitly states that a WTO mem-
ber is not required to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement
than to other areas of law enforcement.o These countries also successfully in-
troduced ambiguities, flexibilities, limitations, and exceptions into the enforce-
ment provisions in the TRIPS Agreement." For example, Articles 41 through
61 contain many vague, broad, undefined, and result-oriented terms. These
terms include "'effective', 'reasonable', 'undue', 'unwarranted', 'fair and equit-
able', and 'not ... unnecessarily complicated or costly."" 2 Many enforcement
7 See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2-6 (2010) (discuss-
ing the costs of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and the resulting trade-offs).
8 See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights 1 7.501, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Panel Report] (acknowl-
edging the "sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding sovereign-
ty"); Frederick M. Abbott, Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:
Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health (International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/innovation-and-technology-transfer-to-address-climate-
change.pdf ("National governments traditionally are unwilling to surrender sovereignty over
the specific implementation of IPRs, just as they are unwilling to surrender sovereignty over
their budgets or their military institutions.").
9 See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 417 (2007) ("Article [41.5] was introduced upon a
proposal by the Indian delegation, and essentially reflects developing countries' concerns
about the implications of Part III of the Agreement. It was not part of the US and EC pro-
posals that provided the basis for most of Part III of the Agreement."); UNCTAD-ICTSD,
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 585 (2005) ("The last paragraph of Article 41
was not suggested in the original U.S. and EC proposals. It was included in order to address
the concerns of developing countries, based on a proposal by the Indian delegation. This was
in fact one of the few provisions in Part III where developing countries' views made a differ-
ence.").
1o See TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5 ("Nothing in [Part III of the Agreement] creates any obliga-
tion with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights and the enforcement of law in general.").
" See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 7 (2001) (advancing the concept of "constructive ambiguities"); Peter K. Yu, The
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REv. 979, 1022-23 (2009)
(discussing the ambiguities within the TRIPS Agreement).
12 UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 9, at 576; see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Stan-
dards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agree-
ment, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23,
71 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008) ("[The TRIPS] enforcement
52 IDEA 3 (2012)
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provisions in the TRIPS Agreement have also been limited to the introduction of
empowerment norms." Instead of mandating specific actions, these provisions
merely require a grant of official authority.14
As a result of these compromises struck during the negotiation process,
the TRIPS enforcement provisions fail to achieve the outcome expected by de-
veloped countries and their supportive industries. In the words of academic
commentators, myself included, these provisions have become the "Achilles'
heel of the TRIPS Agreement."" Although developed countries initially har-
bored hope that the TRIPS regime would be vastly improved through the man-
datory WTO dispute settlement process, they soon realized that the problems
within the enforcement provisions were far too deep.'" Since then, developed
countries have actively pushed for the development of greater enforcement le-
vels at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels." These efforts culmi-
nated in the establishment of ACTA and the recent negotiation of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement.'
provisions-unlike the substantive standards set out in the agreement-are truly minimum
standards, as attested by the loose and open-ended language in which they are cast.").
13 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 43-48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 59.
14 See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking Interna-
tional Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 31 (2011) ("[Tlhe TRIPS
Agreement's enforcement provisions are institution-oriented, not outcome-oriented.").
15 E.g., J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for
Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide intellectual Property Transac-
tions, 9 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 34-39 (1998) (explaining why the enforcement provi-
sions are the "Achilles' heel of the TRIPS Agreement"); Yu, supra note 6 (using "Achilles'
heel" in the title of the article).
16 See Symposium, U.S. Industries, Trade Associations, and Intellectual Property Lawmaking,
10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 10 (2002) (remarks of Jacques J. Gorlin, Director, Intel-
lectual Property Committee) ("We had assumed that most countries would accept the TRIPS
obligations, and dispute settlement would fix a few ... problems. What has happened, how-
ever, is that we are starting to see dispute settlement cases that cover the wholesale failure to
implement TRIPS."); see also Yu, supra note 6, at 483-504 (discussing the historical, eco-
nomic, tactical, disciplinary, and technological challenges hampering the TRIPS Agree-
ment's ability to provide effective global enforcement of intellectual property rights).
'7 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 989-93 (identifying the efforts by developed coun-
tries to push for stronger enforcement at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels).
18 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
tpp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing up-to-date information about the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement); see also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (dis-
cussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement); Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Trans-
border Intellectual Property Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DiscOURSE 16 (2012) (explain-
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Today, the lack of cross-border enforcement of intellectual property
rights remains a major concern for developed countries and intellectual property
rights holders. Many of them have repeatedly complained about the TRIPS
enforcement standards being primitive, constrained, inadequate, and ineffec-
tive." As the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") has shown, "counterfeit and pirated goods in international
trade . .. and could amount to up to USD 250 billion in 2007."20 In China alone,
ing why the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is more dangerous than ACTA from the
public interest standpoint).
19 See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE,
STRATEGY FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES
3 (2005), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc-122636.pdf
("Violations of intellectual property rights ... continue to increase, having reached, in recent
years, industrial proportions. This happens despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO
members have adopted legislation implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement.");
TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ACROSS BORDERS 4 (2008) (noting that "it has become apparent to some national govern-
ments, and regional organizations that the 'aggressive' enforcement provisions of TRIPS,
particularly the border measures, have fallen short of expectations of providing an effective
system of thwarting international movement of infringing goods"); Timothy P. Trainer, Intel-
lectual Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implemen-
tation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2008-2009) (discussing the inadequacies
of the TRIPS enforcement provisions and explaining the need for TRIPS-plus bilateral and
regional free trade agreements in the border enforcement area).
20 See OECD, MAGNITUDE OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY OF TANGIBLE PRODUCTS: AN
UPDATE 1 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/44088872.pdf; see also
About Counterfeiting, INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, http://www.iacc.org/about-
counterfeiting/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) (estimating the global trade in illegitimate goods to
be approximately $600 billion annually); Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, INT'L CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/cib (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) ("Counterfeiting
accounts for between 5-7% of world trade, worth an estimated $600 billion a year."). Al-
though the OECD figures have been widely used, including by the European Commission in
their push for ACTA, see, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA): FACT SHEET 5 (2008), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc140836.11.08.pdf, it is worth not-
ing the problems inherent in that particular study. As Carsten Fink pointed out:
Close inspection of the methodology applied to arrive at this figure reveals
that it is more an "educated guess" than a true estimate. Essentially, OECD
staff made use of seizure rates across different product categories and export-
ing nations to extrapolate what a given share of IPRs-infringing trade in one
individual product category means for the overall share of trade in counterfeit
and pirated goods. However, the share in the relevant "fix-point" product cat-
egories-wearing apparel, leather articles, and tobacco products-underlying
the 200 USD billion estimate is not based on any hard data, but rather reflects
the best guess of OECD staff.
52 IDEA 3 (2012)
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the International Trade Commission estimated that "firms in the U.S. P-
intensive economy that conducted business ... in 2009 reported losses of ap-
proximately $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellec-
tual property right] infringement in China."21
Moreover, commentators pointed out that the sophistication of piracy
and counterfeiting networks have greatly increased in recent years.22 According
to Moisds Naim, the former editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy, today's illicit
trade is no longer limited to rigid, top-down organizations; it has been extended
to "unchartable networks of intermediaries that operate across many borders and
provide different services," including both legitimate and illicit services.23 Some
of these intermediaries "are permanently linked and others vary in their compo-
sition, activities, and geographical scope depending on markets and circums-
tances."24
More problematic, some of the goods traded by these networks have
been dangerous and harmful to the consuming public; counterfeit pharmaceuti-
Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in INT'L
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., Issue Paper No. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xiii, 13
(2009); see also Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES 1, 4--18 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (critically evaluating the quality of research
supplied by media industries); Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 14, 21-25 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (questioning the magnitude of claimed intellectual
property infringement); Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by Multina-
tional Companies on Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 795-800 (2011) (discuss-
ing the flawed assumptions used by multinational corporations in determining volume and
losses from counterfeiting); Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 7, at 7-8
(questioning the accuracy of these data).
21 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBLICATION No. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv
(2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf.
22 See Declaration of Stanford McCoy at 4, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, No. 1:08-cv-01599-AMC (D.D.C. May 29, 2009), available at http://www.
eff.org/files/filenode/EFFPK-v_USTR/McCoy.pdf (considering "the growing sophistication
and resources of international counterfeiters" as a new challenge to enforcing intellectual
property rights); TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 19, at 618 (stating that "greater enforcement
efforts are needed given the increasing sophistication of counterfeiters and pirates").
23 Moists NAIM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 219 (2005).
24 Id. at 219-20.
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cals provide some of the most notorious examples.25 Some policymakers, indus-
try groups, and commentators went even further to associate intellectual proper-
ty piracy and counterfeiting with terrorism and organized crime.26 As the
preamble to ACTA declares: "[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and pirated
goods, as well as of services that distribute infringing material, . . . provides a
source of revenue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public.""
B. Digital Challenges
While challenges at the international level are already significant, the
information revolution and the popularization of the internet have forced devel-
oped countries and intellectual property rights holders to confront a new, and
perhaps greater, set of challenges. Thanks to the high speeds and low costs of
reproduction and distribution, the anonymous architecture, and the many-to-
many communication capabilities, the internet has created large-scale enforce-
ment problems the intellectual property system has never seen before.
Today, the internet, new communications technologies, and file-sharing
networks have caused serious and widespread problems of unauthorized copy-
ing throughout the world. Since 2003, the U.S. recording industry alone has
filed lawsuits against more than 35,000 individuals for illegal distribution of
copyrighted works via peer-to-peer networks.28 Courts in the developed world,
such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, have also been inundated with
cases addressing secondary copyright liability. 29
25 See, e.g., The Difficult Fight Against Counterfeit Drugs, CBS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2011, 3:59
PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/10/60minutes/main20040693.
shtml; NAIM, supra note 23, at 123-25; TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN
COUNTERFEIT GOODS 187-217 (2005); GREGORY F TREVERTON ET AL., FILM PIRACY,
ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORISM (2009); Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOuS. L. REv. 1235,
1239-46 (2009).
26 See, e.g., A Growing Problem with Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism: Hearing on
Int'l Copyright Piracy Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at 137-44;
Maureen Walterbach, Comment, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem of
Transnational Organized Crime Groups' Involvement in Intellectual Property Rights Viola-
tions, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591 (2007).
27 ACTA, supra note 2, pmbl.
28 Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-people-tums-lawsuits-
3-strikes.
29 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding
that the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies could be liable for copyright in-
52 IDEA 3 (2012)
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To provide a deterrent against online illegal file-sharing, Chile, France,
Taiwan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have recently introduced the so-
called graduated response system or are in the process of doing so.30 This me-
chanism enables internet service providers to take a wide variety of actions after
giving users warnings about their potentially illegal online activities." Among
the permissible actions are: suspension or termination of service; capping of
bandwidth; and blocking of sites, portals, and protocols.32
While the TRIPS Agreement was already ineffective against cross-
border enforcement challenges, it was particularly ill-equipped to address digital
challenges.33 At the time of the TRIPS negotiations, many demandeur countries
did not anticipate the technological change that the information revolution was
about to unleash. Even if they had the foresight to anticipate such a change, it is
unlikely that they would have succeeded in introducing new norms in this area.
Although the biotechnology revolution had already raised many difficult policy
and ethical questions by the mid-1980s, Article 27 provides only very limited
fringement committed by individuals using their products if they had "induced" their users to
undertake infringing activities); BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C. 488, aff'd,
[2005] F.C.A. 193 (Can.) (addressing the issue of whether setting up the facilities to allow
copying amounts to authorizing infringement); Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd v. Sharman
License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 I.P.R. 289 (AustI.) (holding the defendant liable for autho-
rizing users to infringe on music copyrights and directing it to modify the software applica-
tion to reduce infringement).
30 See INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011: MUSIC AT
THE TOUCH OF THE BUTroN 3, 19 (2011); Kaitlin Mara, UK Passes Internet Access-Limiting
Bill for Alleged IP Inf ringers, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://www.
ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/08/uk-isps-required-to-limit-internet-access-for-ip-infringers.
31 For discussions of the gradated response system, see generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated
Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV.
81 (2010); Eldar Haber, The French Revolution 2.0: Copyright and the Three Strikes Policy,
2 HARv. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297 (2011); Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call
for Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, 1 WIPO J. 75;
Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1373 (2010).
32 See Yu, supra note 31, at 1374.
3 Although the TRIPS Agreement was adopted in 1994, shortly before the internet and elec-
tronic commerce entered the mainstream, its substantive standards were set at what Daniel
Gervais described as "the highest common denominator among major industrialized coun-
tries as of 1991." Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History
and Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). As a
result, the Agreement failed to address challenges created by new technologies that emerged
after the completion of its primary draft. See id. at 29 ("The 1992 text was not extensively
modified and became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15,
1994.").
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coverage of biotechnology-related issues.' In the end, as far as digital chal-
lenges are concerned, the TRIPS Agreement was obsolete from inception."
To protect their interests, developed countries and intellectual property
rights holders had no choice but to look elsewhere for solutions. Following the
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, countries returned to the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization ("WIPO") to negotiate the 1996 WIPO Internet Trea-
ties. These agreements protect rights holders from digital transmissions that
constitute communications to the public." In addition, they require member
states to adopt adequate protection and effective remedies against circumvention
technologies and services." They also protect rights management information
from alteration and removal in an effort to conceal or facilitate infringement. 9
To induce countries to adopt the norms established in these treaties, the
United States and other developed countries have actively pushed for the inclu-
sion of these norms in their bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agree-
ments.' For example, Article 17.4.7 of the Australia-United States Free Trade
3 See Yu, supra note 6, at 503.
3 See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614-15 (1996) ("Despite its broad sweep and its unstated
aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the scene already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at the same
time that the on-line era became irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not even a nod, to
the fact that a significant portion of the international intellectual property market will soon be
conducted on-line."); see also J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement:
Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
763, 766 (1995) ("[The principal weakness of the TRIPS Agreement] stems from the draf-
ters' technical inability and political reluctance to address the problems facing innovators and
investors at work on important new technologies in an Age of Information. The drafters' de-
cision to stuff these new technologies into the overworked and increasingly obsolete patent
and copyright paradigms simply ignores the systemic contradictions and economic disutilities
this same approach was already generating in the domestic intellectual property systems."
(footnote omitted)).
36 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter
WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-
17, at 18 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT]. See generally Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents
in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 369-75 (2004)
(discussing the development of the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties).
37 See WCT, supra note 36, art. 8; WPPT, supra note 36, art. 15.
38 See WCT, supra note 36, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 36, art. 18.
3 See WCT, supra note 36, art. 12; WPPT, supra note 36, art. 19.
4 See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTs (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade agreements
in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Con-
troversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agree-
ment: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criticizing the
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Agreement and Article 15.5.7 of the Central America-Dominican Republic Free
Trade Agreement stipulate the protection against the circumvention of technolo-
gical protection measures,4 1 similar to the protection required by the WIPO In-
ternet Treaties and the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act.42 Articles 27.5
and 27.6 of ACTA also demand protection against circumvention technologies
and services.43
C. Transborder Challenges
The third type of enforcement challenges is transborder by nature.
Combining both crossover and digital challenges, they take advantage of the
global platform provided by the internet and new communications technologies.
Owing to jurisdictional constraints, this platform provides pirates and counter-
feiters with a widely cherished loophole that is unavailable with physical goods,
which need to be transported through borders." The availability of electronic
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Jean-Fr6ddric Morin, Multilateralizing TRIPs-Plus
Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009) (examin-
ing the United States' free trade agreement strategy); Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual Property
Rights in Free Trade Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum Standards, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 266 (Carlos
M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing free trade agreements in relation to the TRIPS framework);
Yu, supra note 36, at 392-400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral, plurilateral, and re-
gional trade agreements to push for new and higher intellectual property standards); Peter K.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 953, 961-86 (2011) (critically examin-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
41 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.4.7, May 18, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text;
Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 15.1(2),
May 28, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ caf-
ta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text. For similar provisions in other U.S.
free trade agreements, see Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84
DENV. U. L. REv. 13, 41 n.137 (2006).
42 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
43 ACTA, supra note 2, arts. 27.5-.6.
4 Some commentators have described these places as "geopolitical black holes." NAIM, supra
note 23, at 261 ("Geopolitical black holes are the places where the trafficking networks 'live'
and thrive."). As Moisds Naim explained:
Criminal networks thrive on international mobility and their ability to take
advantage of the opportunities that flow from the separation of marketplaces
into sovereign states with borders. For criminals, frontiers create business op-
portunities and convenient shields. But for the government officials chasing
the criminals, borders are often insurmountable obstacles.
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commerce has also provided the support needed to enable criminals to hide their
activities and ill-gotten gains. As Mois6s Naim explained:
[The internet's] value to traffickers is immense, and its specific uses too many
to enumerate. Those involved in illicit transactions communicate with one
another from the privacy and anonymity of Web-based e-mail accounts, fre-
quently changed and accessed from cybercafes and unobtrusive venues. They
monitor shipments using the tracing services that FedEx and its peers provide.
They offer goods for sale via online display cases.... The Internet recruits
mercenaries, advertises unscrupulous transport companies, hosts professional-
looking Web sites that are electronic fronts for bogus businesses. . . . The In-
ternet allows traffickers to communicate privately and efficiently, to operate
as many transactions as possible in virtual rather than geographic space, and
creates new ways to move and conceal funds. All this without concern for
physical location, freeing the traffickers to play across borders and cover their
tracks without impeding the actual flow of goods.45
In January 2011, MarkMonitor, a brand protection and management
firm, published a report showing that traffic to sites suspected of offering pirated
digital content or counterfeit goods amounts to more than 146 million visits per
day and fifty-three billion visits per year.' According to the report, "the top-
three websites classified as 'digital piracy'-rapidshare.com, megavideo.com,
and megaupload.com--collectively generate more than 21 billion visits per
year."47
... [A]ll government bureaucracies have a hard time working effectively out-
side their country, assuming they have the opportunity to do so thanks to a
partnership or diplomatic agreement. Their natural habitat is at home, not
abroad. A government agency needs as much training and specialized equip-
ment to operate in another national jurisdiction as a diver needs to operate un-
derwater. Public bureaucracies of one country usually do not do well operat-
ing outside the legal and political environment of their own country.
Id. at 13, 232.
45 Id. at 23-24; see also TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 19, at 427 ("Today, the Internet serves
many functions-a communications and research tool, an entertainment medium, and an on-
line marketplace for the sale of goods and services. Just as legitimate companies see e-
commerce as an effective medium to advertise, market, distribute and sell legitimate prod-
ucts, counterfeiters and pirates also see it as an effective and less costly means by which to
advertise, market, and distribute pirated and counterfeit products to a much broader au-
dience.").
4 MARKMONITOR, TRAFFIC REPORT: ONLINE PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING 4 (2011), available
at http://www.markmonitor.com/download/report/MarkMonitor_-_Traffic-Report_110111.
pdf.
47 Id.; see also Ben Sisario, U.S. Charges Popular Site with Piracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2012,
at BI (reporting the seizure of the website Megaupload and the arrest of seven people con-
nected with its operation).
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Indeed, downloading services, cyberlockers, online auction sites, trad-
ing platforms, bulletin boards, warez groups, and underground networks have
created significant challenges for intellectual property rights holders.48 As the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") reported, massive piracy threats
are posed by such notorious internet sites as Baidu in China, vKontake in Rus-
sia, allofmp3.com clones in Russia and Ukraine, isoHunt in Canada, and The
Pirate Bay in Sweden.49 The problems created by the internet are so severe that
the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center has recently be-
gun to actively seize internet domain names that are tied to piratical and coun-
terfeiting activities.' Thus far, seizure orders have "targeted online retailers of a
diverse array of counterfeit goods, including sports equipment, shoes, handbags,
athletic apparel and sunglasses as well as illegal copies of copyrighted DVD
boxed sets, music and software."
Toward the end of 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Combat-
ing Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA).52 This law has now
been reintroduced as PIPA.3 If enacted, the law would enable the Attorney
General to shut down infringing websites, services, and networks by applying
for "a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or an injunction, . . .
against the non-domestic domain name used by an Internet site dedicated to
infringing activities, or against a registrant of such domain name, or the owner
or operator of such Internet site dedicated to infringing activities."54
A few months later, Representative Lamar Smith introduced its coun-
terpart in the House of Representatives.s" Known as the Stop Online Piracy Act
("SOPA"), the legislation has been so controversial that Wikipedia, Reddit,
48 See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
881, 933 (2011) ("From allofmp3.com in Russia to the Pirate Bay in Sweden, foreign web-
sites, services, and networks have created significant challenges for copyright holders.").
49 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. [USTR], OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NoTORIoUS
MARKETS (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/2595.
so See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Federal Courts Order Seizure of 82 Website Domains
Involved in Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of DOJ and ICE Cyber Monday Crackdown
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/November/lO-ag-1355.
html.
51 Id.
52 S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010).
5 S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). For criticisms of this bill, see generally Letter from Prof. John
R. Allison et al. to Members of the U.S. Cong. (July 5, 2011) (opposing PIPA). In the inter-
est of full disclosure, the Author has signed on to the law professors' letter in opposition to
this Act.
5 S. 968, I12th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
" H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
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WordPress, and other internet companies launched a service blackout on Janu-
ary 18, 2012 in protest of the legislation. 6 Bowing to pressure from internet
companies and the user community, several Congressional representatives with-
drew their support for the proposed legislation.57 Representative Lamar Smith
and Senator Harry Reid also announced the postponement of consideration of
SOPA and PIPA. 8
In sum, although transnational challenges strongly resemble the first
two types of challenges, the issues they raise are much more complex. By link-
ing domestic and foreign enforcement problems, they underscore the impossibil-
ity of tackling domestic problems without considering their foreign counter-
parts." The existence of these challenges further offers the much-needed justifi-
cation for a higher benchmark for global intellectual property enforcement.
II. ACTA
A. The ACTA Negotiations
To target the various enforcement challenges, developed countries-
notably, Japan, the United States, members of the European Union, and Switzer-
land-banded together in the late 2000s to establish a new anti-counterfeiting
treaty called the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.' Building on Japan's
proposal for a "Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Counterfeits and Pirated
56 Jonathan Weisman, Web Rises Up to Deflect Bills Seen as Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012,
at Al.
5 Guy Adams, Is Wikipedia Winning the War?, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 20, 2012, at 34.
5 Hayley Tsukayama, Action Is Postponed on House Online Piracy Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2012, at All.
5 Nevertheless, it is important for policymakers not to let foreign challenges distort their priori-
ties toward combating piracy at the domestic level. As I explained earlier:
[A] focus on foreign piracy could create an illusion about the government's
enforcement priorities. It will also create the misleading impression that many
of the existing domestic copyright problems would disappear if foreign piracy
were eradicated. Worse still, such a focus suggests that the domestic prob-
lems resulted from some foreign culprits, even though a causal link between
the two does not always exist. The obsession with foreign piracy may even
divert the policymakers' much-needed attention to tackle domestic copyright
problems.
Yu, supra at 48, at 933.
a For a history of the development of ACTA, see generally Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2,
at 980-98.
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Goods,"' this highly controversial agreement seeks to set a new and higher
benchmark for intellectual property enforcement.' The negotiations of this plu-
rilateral agreement were limited to only like-minded countries, due in part to the
developing countries' strong resistance to enforcement-related discussions in
both the WTO and WIPO. 63
On October 23, 2007, two weeks after WIPO adopted its recommenda-
tions for the Development Agenda,' Japan, the United States, and the European
Union formally announced their intent to negotiate a new anti-counterfeiting
treaty with key trading partners.' In addition to this usual trilateral alliance for
heightened intellectual property protection, the negotiating parties included Aus-
61 Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Japan Proposes New IP Enforcement Treaty, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/11/15/japan-proposes-new-
ip-enforcement-treaty/.
62 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 980-83 (discussing Japan's original proposal).
63 See id. at 989-92 (discussing the resistance of less developed countries in both the WTO and
WIPO). As I summarized earlier:
For the first fifteen years of the WTO's existence, developed countries have
had very limited success in pushing for higher international intellectual prop-
erty enforcement standards within the organization-through either the TRIPS
Council or the mandatory dispute settlement process. Although WTO mem-
bers sought to make a similar push in WIPO, the other traditional forum for
setting international intellectual property norms, that forum was equally hos-
tile. With the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda in October
2004 and the adoption of forty-five recommendations for the agenda three
years later, WIPO does not provide an ideal forum for developing new and
higher international intellectual property enforcement norms.
Yu, supra note 6, at 511 (footnotes omitted).
6 See Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Member States Adopt a Develop-
ment Agenda for WIPO (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/enlarticles/2007/ ar-
ticle_007 1.html; see also The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development
Agenda, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last
visited July 6, 2008) [hereinafter 45 Adopted Recommendations] (listing the forty-five rec-
ommendations for actions).
65 Press Release, Comm'n of the European Communities, European Commission Seeks
Mandate to Negotiate Major New International Anti-Counterfeiting Pact (Oct. 23, 2007),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1573; Press Re-
lease, Ministry of Foreign Aff. of Jp., Framework of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment (ACTA) (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jplannounce/announce/2007/10/ 1175848_836.html; Press Release,
USTR, Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight
Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinafter USTR Press Release], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-
fight-fakes.
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tralia, Canada, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and
Switzerland.' As the USTR declared in its press release: "The goal [of the
Agreement] is to set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that countries
can join on a voluntary basis .... The envisioned ACTA will include commit-
ments in three areas: (1) strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving
enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong legal framework for IPR en-
forcement."67
Since the announcement, eleven rounds of negotiations were held over a
span of close to three years,6 and thirty-seven countries participated in the full
negotiations.' While countries were initially worried about ACTA's inconsis-
tencies with their existing laws and international treaty obligations, the Agree-
ment was finally adopted on April 15, 2011 . A few months later, the Agree-
ment was signed by more than two-thirds of the negotiating parties, including
Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and
the United States." As of this Lecture, ACTA is awaiting ratification and has
not yet entered into force.72
In its final form, ACTA contains six different chapters: (1) initial provi-
sions and definitions; (2) legal framework for enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights; (3) enforcement practices; (4) international cooperation; (5) institu-
tional arrangements; and (6) final provisions. Chapter II, which is the most
controversial and longest part of the Agreement, is subdivided into five different
sections: (a) general obligations; (b) civil enforcement; (c) border measures; (d)
6 ACTA, supra note 2, art. 39 n.17.
67 USTR Press Release, supra note 65.
68 These eleven rounds of negotiations were held in Geneva, Washington, Tokyo, Paris, Rabat,
Seoul, Guadalajara, Wellington, Lucerne, Washington, and Tokyo. See Yu, Six Secret Fears,
supra note 2, at 985-86.
69 In addition to these countries, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates also participated in the
first round of negotiations. See id. at 1075.
70 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Aff. of Jp., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) (Opening for Signature) (May 1, 2011), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/ an-
nounce/announce/2011/5/0501_01.html.
71 Press Release, USTR, Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Negotiating Parties (Oct. 1, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
press-releases/20 11/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag.
72 ACTA will "enter into force thirty days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval as between those Signatories that have deposited their
respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval." ACTA, supra note 2, art.
40.1.
73 See id. arts. 1-45.
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criminal enforcement; and (e) enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
digital environment.74
Although ACTA is clearly an indictment of the TRIPS Agreement's
failure to meet the enforcement needs and expectations of developed countries
and their intellectual property industries," the Agreement is also quite ambitious
in scope. In addition to addressing the TRIPS Agreement's shortcomings in the
area of cross-border enforcement, ACTA seeks to incorporate new measures to
target digital and transnational challenges."6 While Article 23.3 facilitates the
introduction of anti-camcording laws," Article 23.4 includes new provisions
that may create new criminal penalties for "aiding and abetting" intellectual
property infringement"-penalties that do not yet exist in the United States.79
74 See id. arts. 6-27.
75 See Jeffery Atik, ACTA and the Destabilization of TRIPS, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGy
TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID & TRADE DEVELOPMENT 121, 145 (Hans Henrik Lidgard
et al. eds., 2012) ("ACTA is a critique of TRIPS-its very core signals a diagnosis that
TRIPS inadequately addressed the problem of IP enforcement."); Catherine Saez, ACTA a
Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30,
2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-
multil ateral-system-wipo-head-says/ (reporting the concern of WIPO Director General Fran-
cis Gurry that countries are "taking matters into their own hands to seek solutions outside of
the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of the present system").
76 See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.
77 See ACTA, supra note 2, art. 23.3 ("A Party may provide criminal procedures and penalties
in appropriate cases for the unauthorized copying of cinematographic works from a perfor-
mance in a motion picture exhibition facility generally open to the public.").
7 See id. art. 23.4 ("With respect to the offences specified in [Article 23] for which a Party
provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall ensure that criminal liability for
aiding and abetting is available under its law.").
7 As Gwen Hinze observed in her preliminary analysis of the consolidated draft:
[T]he text includes a EU proposal, for criminal sanctions for "inciting, aiding
and abetting" intellectual property infringement (Article 2.15(2)). That lan-
guage is taken from the draft 2007 EU IPR enforcement criminal sanction di-
rective. US copyright law does not recognize the concept of "inciting" copy-
right infringement, so it is unclear what this means and when it would apply.
This raises the concern that ACTA could expand the scope of secondary copy-
right liability for Internet intermediaries, consumer device manufacturers and
software developers, beyond the boundaries of the doctrines enunciated by US
courts.
Gwen Hinze, Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-
officially-released -acta-text.
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B. Three Major Flaws
Notwithstanding the many TRIPS-plus standards ACTA seeks to create,
it remains doubtful that developed countries and their intellectual property in-
dustries would finally receive the higher levels of global enforcement they have
long craved. There are at least three reasons for these doubts, all of which are
attributed to the Agreement's inherent flaws.
First, ACTA fails to focus on the shortcomings of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. During the ACTA negotiations, the U.S. administration claimed that
"ACTA would focus on border measures and enforcement practices, rather than
creating new regulation standards."' Likewise, the European Commission in-
sisted that the Agreement "does not focus on private, non-commercial activities
of individuals, nor will it result in the monitoring of individuals or intrude in
their private sphere.""1
In its final form, however, ACTA has clearly gone beyond what these
administrations intended, or claimed they had intended. In fact, the negotiating
parties were so eager to create new standards to target new types of intellectual
property enforcement challenges that the Agreement has arguably veered off its
original path. Instead of setting enforcement norms for a narrow category of
intellectual property violations-namely, counterfeiting and piracy-ACTA
now has the potential of covering virtually every category of intellectual proper-
ty rights included in the TRIPS Agreement." Even worse, while ACTA was
initially created with an arguably laudable goal of targeting criminal counterfei-
ters, it has been captured by intellectual property industries to target ordinary
80 Stephanie Condon, Bush Administration Defends Secrecy over Anti-counterfeiting Treaty,
CNET (Sept. 22, 2008, 3:14 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10047945-38.html.
8 COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEMNG TRADE AGREEMENT
(ACTA): FACT SHEET 2 (Mar. 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/march/ tra-
doc_145958.pdf.
82 Article 5(h) of ACTA now provides: "[Ilintellectual property refers to all categories of intel-
lectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part H of the TRIPS Agree-
ment." ACTA, supra note 2, art. 5(h). In addition to copyrights and trademarks, these cate-
gories include geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, plant variety protection,
layout designs of integrated circuits, and the protection for undisclosed information-and
perhaps utility models, trade names, and other forms of unfair competition, as incorporated
into the TRIPS Agreement by reference to the Paris Convention. See Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 8, 10bis, 11, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (re-
vised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). Such recognition was in part the result of the European
Union's repeated demands that all intellectual property rights be treated equally. See Monika
Ermert, European Commission on ACTA: TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Apr. 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/22/european-commiss
ion-on-acta-trips-is-floor-not-ceiling/.
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consumers.83 In its final form, the Agreement is as much "a regime for global
Internet regulation" as it is an international intellectual property agreement."
Second, by using a "country club" approach to bring together like-
minded countries, ACTA fails to include countries that are the major sources of
piracy and counterfeiting. Consequently, the Agreement fails to target the crux
of the problems that the negotiating parties identified in the beginning of the
negotiations." To be certain, the original intention of the negotiators was to
have the Agreement established first before gradually extending it to other par-
ties in "a second phase."" Nevertheless, given the lack of participation by ma-
jor developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, in the negotiations, it
is unclear how ACTA could induce countries that have not already signed non-
multilateral agreements with the United States or the European Union to take up
these new international enforcement obligations."
83 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1086.
84 Eddan Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/1 1/stopping-acta-juggernaut.
85 See Michael Geist, Japan Wanted Canada Out of Initial ACTA Group, MICHAEL GEIST'S
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5656/125/ (quoting a confi-
dential U.S. government cable disclosed through WikiLeaks as saying that "[Hisamitsu] Arai
[the Secretary General of the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters of Japan] stressed
that we should move as fast as possible and keep in mind that the intent of the agreement is
to address the IPR problems of third-nations such as China, Russia, and Brazil, not to nego-
tiate the different interests of like-minded countries").
86 DiscussioN PAPER ON A POSSIBLE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 1, 1 (2007),
available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/ACTA-discussion-paper-1.pdf. It
remains unclear which countries the original drafters intended to target at the second phase.
As revealed in a confidential U.S. government cable recently disclosed through WikiLeaks:
The GOJ [Government of Japan] sees the most likely candidates for the first
tranche including France, UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Singa-
pore. The GOJ sees Italy and Canada as countries which should be ap-
proached in the second group, but [Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Moore]
explained potential difficulties with Canada, and pushed for the inclusion of
developing countries such as Jordan and Morocco in the first tranche, too.
These countries had accepted high IPR standards in their FTA's with the U.S.
Geist, supra note 85.
87 As a recent EU study declares:
ACTA does not include the emerging market countries that are perceived by
European and US stakeholders to be the main sources of counterfeit products.
It is not clear what incentive such emerging markets would have to accede to
ACTA. In a single issue negotiation such as ACTA they would not gain any
further access or guarantees in other sectors and would in any case, benefit
from the existing legal provisions in ACTA members. Unlike for goods, there
is no regional or FTA exception (GATT Article XXIV) in the TRIPS Agree-
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Consider, for example, China, whose piracy and counterfeiting prob-
lems have provided a major impetus for the development of new international
intellectual property enforcement norms." Oft-criticized for its inadequate pro-
tection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, that country was recently
involved in a WTO dispute with the United States over the protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights." While China had ample incentives to
join the WTO, and in fact considered WTO accession a matter of national
pride,' it is hard to imagine China feeling the same toward ACTA.91
ment. Therefore, ACTA Parties cannot discriminate against non-ACTA WTO
parties in their implementation of their IP obligations unless they can clearly
describe those provisions as unequivocally TRIP[S]-plus obligations that are
not covered by the national treatment and MFN [most-favored-nation] clauses
in TRIPS Articles 3 and 4. This would however be very difficult as those ar-
ticles apply to protection of intellectual property subject matter covered by the
agreement. Non-ACTA parties would therefore already benefit from the en-
forcement that ACTA parties would be obliged to provide for their citizens.
ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS ET AL., THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
(ACTA): AN ASSESSMENT 66 (2011).
88 For the Author's earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, see
generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China
in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puz-
Zle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Yu, China Puzzle].
89 See Panel Report, supra note 8.
9 See Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A REASSESSMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004)
(noting China's willingness "to gain WTO entry at almost any price"); see also Yu, From Pi-
rates to Partners, supra note 88, at 192 (describing how Chinese leaders "longed for China's
regaining its rightful place following centuries of humiliation and semi-colonial rule").
91 The same is true for other large middle-income countries, such as India and Brazil. As
Anand Sharma, the Indian commerce and industry minister, noted: "If [the TRIPS Agree-
ment] has to be revisited in any stage in future, it will be only in multilateral forum-the
WTO, it cannot be done outside." India Will Not Accept Any Intellectual Property Talks
Outside WTO: Anand Sharma, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011, 4:01 AM), available at http:l ar-
ticles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-04-09/news/29400634_lintellectual-property-
trips-agreement-anand-sharm; see also Michael Geist, Brazil, India Speak Out Against
ACTA, MICHAEL GEIST'S BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.calcontent/
view/5362I196/ ("Brazilian officials say they do not recognize the legitimacy of the treaty,
while Indian officials say they have other priorities and do not see what they would gain from
ACTA.").
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Moreover, countries tend to adhere to norms they helped to shape.' In
today's age, developing countries-especially the powerful ones-are unlikely
to buy into a system they did not help to shape. As the geopolitical clout and
economic power of these countries have increased considerably, the days when
a system could be created by developed countries and then shoved down the
throats of developing countries are long gone." Thus, if "enhanced international
cooperation and more effective international enforcement" remain some of the
Agreement's key goals, as stated in its preamble,94 it is ill-advised to ignore
these crucial partners in the negotiations." It is also short-sighted to turn away
countries by virtue of their lack of like-mindedness.
Even worse, by developing intellectual property protection outside the
traditional fora, such as WIPO and the WTO, the negotiation of ACTA under-
mined the stability of the international trading system and the preference for the
multilateral process." Such negotiation also alienated the trading partners of the
92 See Kaitlin Mara & Monika Ermert, ACTA Risks Long-Term Damage to Democratic Public
Policymaking, NGOs Say, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 11:02 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-risks-long-term-damage-to-democratic-public-
policymaking-ngos-say/ ("At the 'end of the day, ACTA is about Brazil, India' and other
emerging economies .... If those countries 'who are the targets [and] who have for too long
sat on the sidelines and said they weren't part of the process ... are willing to stand up and
be more aggressive,' then ACTA could be turned into something that would not risk upset-
ting a balanced IP regime." (quoting Michael Geist, Canada Research Chair in Internet and
E-Commerce Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa)); see also Sam Nunn, Address to
the American Assembly, in LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 277, 285 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997) ("China will be more likely to adhere to inter-
national norms that it has helped to shape."); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 88, at
200-01 (discussing the need to "encourage Chinese membership and active participation in
international organizations").
9 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1091.
9 See ACTA, supra note 2, pmbl., recital 3 ("Desiring to combat such proliferation through
enhanced international cooperation and more effective international enforcement. . . .").
9 Accord Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: What's It All
About? 4-5 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgilview con-
tent.cgi?article=1017&context=kimweatherall (last visited May 3, 2010) ("To the extent that
it is cooperation with these countries which is most likely to achieve the long-term goal of
countering counterfeiting, it makes little sense to draft a treaty that will never include these
crucial partners."); see also IQsensato, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA): Global Policy Implications, IN Focus, June 2, 2008, at 3, available at http:l
www.iqsensato.org/pdf/InFocus%20-ACTA%20-%2OVol%202%20-Issue%208.pdf (stating
that ACTA "seeks confrontation, particularly with developing countries as opposed to coop-
eration and ignores the efforts by the latter group of countries to implement TRIPS in re-
source-poor settings").
96 To some extent, it reminds us of a major shortcoming of the unilateral approach embodied in
the Section 301 process. As Assafa Endeshaw noted:
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ACTA negotiating parties, making it more difficult to undertake future multila-
teral discussions.97
Third, ACTA could create unintended consequences that result in a ma-
jor setback for some of the world's poorest countries-especially in the areas of
public health, sustainable agriculture, and food security. Consider public health,
for example. During the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Doha Declaration")
was adopted to underscore the importance of providing access to essential medi-
cines in developing countries." The first two paragraphs of the Declaration
explicitly "recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics ... [and] the need for the
[TRIPS Agreement] to be part of the wider national and international action to
address these problems."99
By introducing TRIPS-plus standards, ACTA is likely to greatly restrict
the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement that are explicitly recognized in para-
graph 5 of the Doha Declaration." The Agreement might even help facilitate
[The] United States approach will work towards overthrowing any measure
of success that the United States has achieved in placing intellectual property
on an arguably "international" pedestal (the TRIPs) after passing through long
periods of bilateral arrangements. Consequently, the quiet overhaul that the
international IP system has been subjected to through the TRIPS may now be
in danger of collapse by the American insistence that it will interpret IP trea-
ties and take any measures it deems appropriate, unilaterally and from its own
national perspective. Each move of the United States to take IP matters
throughout the world in its own hands will increasingly reduce the global sig-
nificance of the TRIPs formula to a national system that has been outdated for
quite some time.
Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on Intellectual Property,
6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 337-38 (1996).
9 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1078.
98 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
99 Id. Ifi[ 1-2.
100 Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration explicitly recognizes the following flexibilities:
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the
object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objec-
tives and principles.
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom
to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
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strategic litigation that harasses the legitimate trade in generic drugs."o' Indeed,
ACTA might lead to provisions that would make it difficult for generic pharma-
ceuticals to be delivered to these countries, despite the Agreement's recognition
of the principles set forth in the Doha Declaration" and the objectives and prin-
ciples laid out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.0o Although ACTA
does not require the seizure of "in transit" goods, it includes provisions that au-
thorize such seizure" as well as provisions on border measures and civil and
criminal enforcement that could have serious ramifications for access to essen-
tial medicines in the developing world.'
III. A MORE EFFECTIVE ACTA
Given the flaws of both the TRIPS Agreement and ACTA, one may
wonder whether treaties can still provide a viable strategy to strengthen global
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.
Id. 1 5; see also Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and
Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINEs 27, 30 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (noting the vari-
ous flexibilities developing countries still have in the public health arena despite the entering
into force of the TRIPS Agreement).
1o1 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1092.
102 See ACTA, supra note 2, pmbl.
103 See id. art. 2.3.
'I See id. art. 16.2 ("A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to suspect in-transit
goods .... ).
1os See SEAN FLYNN, ACTA AND ACCESS TO MEDICINEs 3 (2011), available at http://rfc.act-on-
acta.eu/access-to-medicines ("[ACTA] increases the risks and consequences of wrongful
searches, seizures, lawsuits and other enforcement actions against legitimate suppliers of ge-
neric medicines."); Brook K. Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to
Medicines, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 579 (2011) (discussing ACTA's impact on access to me-
dicines); James Love, Mich~le Rivasi Asks Question About ACTA and Access to Medicine,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Oct. 26, 2010, 8:15 AM), http://keionline.org/node/994 (noting
the concerns of Michile Rivasi, a Member of the European Parliament, about ACTA's im-
pact on access to essential medicines).
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enforcement of intellectual property rights. The answer is mostly positive. The
enforcement problems that the TRIPS Agreement and ACTA encounter lie not
in the treaty-based approach. Rather, they reflect the flaws in treaty design.
These flaws underscore the challenges to drafting an international treaty that
effectively promotes global enforcement of intellectual property rights. To help
rectify these design flaws, this Part outlines four commonsensical and easy-to-
follow guiding principles that policymakers can use to strengthen global en-
forcement of intellectual property rights:
1. The treaty should address the problem it seeks to solve.
2. If the problem does not lie here, look for solutions elsewhere.
3. The treaty should include all of the major parties whose cooperation
is needed to solve the problem.
4. The treaty should not cost more than its benefits.
A. Principle 1: The Treaty Should Address the Problem It Seeks to
Solve
It is beyond cavil that a successful intellectual property enforcement
treaty needs to address the problem it seeks to solve. As noted earlier, one of
ACTA's major flaws is the mismatch between its intended goals and the final
adopted language."3 6 If the treaty's goal is to address problems left behind by
the TRIPS Agreement, it needs to focus on those problems, as opposed to ad-
dressing a new set of problems not anticipated by the TRIPS negotiators.
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with developing new standards of
intellectual property enforcement to target new types of enforcement challenges.
Indeed, such development is expected, given the changing economic and tech-
nological conditions and the dynamic nature of the intellectual property sys-
tem."o7 Nevertheless, such development would not help address our existing
problems. By delaying the search for solutions to address the problems inherent
in the TRIPS Agreement, ACTA has left those problems largely intact.
Consider, for example, the two TRIPS provisions that doomed the Unit-
ed States' complaint' 8 in China-Measures Affecting the Protection and En-
106 See discussion supra Part II.B.
107 See Yu, supra note 6, at 502-03 (discussing the technological challenges that impede the
TRIPS Agreement's ability to provide effective global enforcement of intellectual property
rights).
1os See id. at 511 ("[Tihe panel's narrow focus and the limited scope of its findings clearly re-
vealed the TRIPS Agreement's shortcomings in the enforcement area. Such revelation, in
turn, provided the momentum needed for developed countries to push for stronger interna-
tional intellectual property enforcement norms both within and without the WTO." (footnote
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forcement of Intellectual Property Rights.'" Article 61 provided the basis of the
United States' claim that the high thresholds in Chinese law for applying crimi-
nal procedures and penalties to intellectual property infringement were inconsis-
tent with the TRIPS Agreement; o yet, the crucial term in the provision, "com-
mercial scale," was largely undefined."' The lack of such a definition eventual-
ly posed a fatal challenge to the United States' complaint."2
Article 59 was equally problematic for the United States." 3 The provi-
sion states that "competent authorities shall have the authority to order the de-
struction or disposal of infringing goods" seized at the border."' Instead of spe-
cifying action the authorities must take, the provision merely creates an empo-
werment norm."' Thus, pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, customs authorities
need not order any destruction or disposal of the seized goods as long as they
have the authority to do so.116
Given the significant barriers to successful WTO litigation that the am-
biguous and vague TRIPS provisions have created, it is only logical that any
new intellectual property enforcement treaty developed among high-
protectionist countries should seek to address these shortcomings. At the very
least, they should clarify some of the ambiguous language. Surprisingly, al-
omitted)); see also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, China-Intellectual Property Rights: Impli-
cations for the TRIPS-Plus Border Measures, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620, 626 (2010)
(noting that the panel's clarifications on the limited scope of the TRIPS Agreement have
hinted at the "rationale for several TRIPS-Plus initiatives in the field of border measures").
'0 Panel Report, supra note 8.
lio See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 3, at 1056-69 (discussing this claim).
1 The first sentence of Article 61 provides: "Members shall provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on a commercial scale." TRIPS Agreement art. 61; see also Panel Report, supra note
8, N 7.532-.579 (providing the interpretation of the phrase "on a commercial scale").
112 Because the United States was unable to advance sufficient evidence to "demonstrate what
constituted 'a commercial scale' in the specific situation of China's marketplace," the WTO
panel found that the United States had failed to substantiate its claim. Panel Report, supra
note 8, 17.615-616.
113 See TRIPS Agreement art. 59.
114 Id. (emphasis added).
"1s See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 3, at 1069-75 (discussing the United
States' claim in the WTO dispute that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to properly
dispose of infringing goods seized at the border pursuant to Articles 59 and 46 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
116 See id. at 1069; see also Panel Report, supra note 8, 7.238 (stating that a WTO member is
not required to "exercise [the stipulated] authority in a particular way, unless otherwise speci-
fied").
Volume 52 - Number 3
264 IDEA-The Intellectual Property Law Review
though Article 23.1 did expand the definition of the term "commercial scale"-
by extending criminal penalties to copyright related activities that have only
"indirect economic or commercial advantage"' 17-a significant portion of the
Agreement focuses on mostly new issues concerning digital piracy,"I norms that
were not included in the TRIPS Agreement."' Article 27, for example, covers
issues that range from intermediary liability of internet service providers, to the
disclosure of internet subscribers' information, to the protection against circum-
vention technologies and services.120
More problematic, in a world where no international supergovernment
exists, it is unclear how the enforcement obligations in ACTA are to be en-
forced. Unlike the TRIPS Agreement, ACTA does not even include a dispute
settlement process.' 2 ' Without the ability to resolve disputes, one has to wonder
what recourse countries will have if their counterparts do not comply with the
117 ACTA, supra note 2, art. 23.1. Notwithstanding this provision, it is worth noting that the
WTO panel has made it clear that plurilateral agreements such as ACTA would not constitute
subsequent practice within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 754-57 (discussing
the panel's rejection of the use of U.S. free trade agreements as subsequent practice).
118 As Michael Geist pointed out, "according to a document [he] . . . obtained under the Access
to Information Act, Canadian Heritage officials [initially] referred to [ACTA] as a Trade
Agreement on Copyright Infringement." Michael Geist, DFAIT Launches Consultation on
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www. michael-
geist.ca/content/view/2815/125/. While counterfeiting no doubt refers to trademarked prod-
ucts, copyright infringement is technically in the piracy realm. By using the name ACTA, as
compared to Anti-Piracy Trade Agreement (or APTA), the Agreement's proponents sought
to frame the negotiations in a way that would help earn support from both policymakers and
the public at large. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1085 n.639. After all, as one
commentator noted: "It is hard to argue against increased enforcement against terrorist fi-
nancing and deadly drugs. It is significantly easier, however, to argue that teenagers down-
loading music should not be subject to similarly increased sanctions." Margot Kaminski,
Recent Development, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2009).
119 See discussion supra Part I.B.
120 ACTA, supra note 2, arts. 27.3-6. For a critique of some of these regulatory measures, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48
U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 693, 701-19 (2010).
121 Instead of providing a dispute settlement procedure, ACTA merely outlines the consultation
process between the signatory parties over matters affecting the Agreement's implementa-
tion. See ACTA, supra note 2, art. 38. Although Canada advanced proposals in the area,
other ACTA negotiating parties, notably New Zealand, were somewhat reluctant to develop
such a mechanism. See Michael Geist, Toward an ACTA Super-Structure: How ACTA May
Replace WIPO, MICHAEL GEIST's BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.cal con-
tent/view/4910/125/.
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treaty obligations. Should disputes arise, countries will most likely have to fall
back on the proven ineffective enforcement standards found in the TRIPS
Agreement.12  Indeed, this fallback has raised serious questions about the neces-
sity and effectiveness of the new agreement in the first place.
To a large extent, ACTA has generated an enforcement loop. By adding
a new layer of unenforceable enforcement obligations on top of a preexisting
layer of hard-to-enforce enforcement obligations in the TRIPS Agreement,
ACTA fails to address the TRIPS enforcement problems. In the end, countries
will most likely have to negotiate another agreement to address the shortcom-
ings of not only the TRIPS Agreement, but also ACTA. If that new agreement
is still insufficient, a fourth or even a fifth agreement will have to be created.
Thus, until policymakers are willing to target the crux of the problems in exist-
ing treaties, an endless enforcement loop will continue.
In sum, if an intellectual property enforcement treaty is to be developed
to address the enforcement problems left behind by the TRIPS Agreement, it
needs to fine-tune the original agreement. For example, a successful agreement
could clarify some of the vague and ambiguous language built into the TRIPS
Agreement. Despite the forty-five provisions in ACTA, we still have no idea
what the term "enforcement" means or what "effective" enforcement would
entail.123 In addition, a new agreement could provide more granular enforce-
ment obligations that are more specific and that target urgent problems that
countries need to address.
B. Principle 2: If the Problem Does Not Lie Here, Look for
Solutions Elsewhere
Commentators love to joke about how economists tend to look for solu-
tions under the proverbial lamppost. 24 A variant of this joke goes as follows:
A man comes up to an economist who is searching for something under the
light of a lamppost. The man asks the economist what he is doing and the
economist replies that he is looking for a key that he has lost. Offering to
help, the man asks the economist where he thinks he dropped the key. The
economist gestures towards a darkened area far away from the lamppost.
Surprised by this response, the man asks the economist why he is not looking
122 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1089.
123 Cf. Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 88, at 927-28 (discussing the TRIPS Agree-
ment's failure to define what constitutes "effective" protection).
124 E.g., Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 671 n.144 (1999).
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over in the area where he dropped the key. The economist re lies that he is
looking under the lamp post because there is more light there.'
The moral of this story is applicable to the design of intellectual proper-
ty enforcement treaties. One of the major challenges to enforcement is the lack
of an "enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection."'26 if
an intellectual property enforcement treaty is to be effective, it needs to provide
the much-needed preconditions for the development of such an enabling envi-
ronment. Examples of these preconditions are a consciousness of legal rights; a
respect for the rule of law; an effective and independent judiciary; a well-
functioning innovation and competition system; a sufficiently developed basic
infrastructure; a critical mass of local stakeholders; and established business
practices.127
Thus far, these key preconditions have not been the focus of either the
TRIPS Agreement or ACTA-or, for that matter, other TRIPS-plus bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements. ACTA, for example,
only includes provisions on raising consumer awareness,'28 building capacity,
and facilitating technical assistance.'29 Even more challenging from the stand-
point of treaty design, many of the reforms needed to develop these precondi-
tions are often not directly related to intellectual property or international
trade.130 As a result, the items may not fall squarely within the domain of the
125 Id
126 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 213-16 (discussing the importance of an enabling
environment for effective intellectual property protection).
127 See Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1
WIPO J. 1, 14 (2009) (listing the key preconditions for successful intellectual property re-
forms).
128 See ACTA, supra note 2, art. 31 ("Each Party shall, as appropriate, promote the adoption of
measures to enhance public awareness of the importance of respecting intellectual property
rights and the detrimental effects of intellectual property rights infringement."). A key ques-
tion regarding efforts to promote public awareness of intellectual property rights concerns
whether these efforts would accurately reflect the current intellectual property system, in
which the rights are just as important as the limitations and exceptions. As David Lange
rightly noted, it is "fundamentally wrong to insist that children internalize the proprietary and
moral values of the copyright system." David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 471. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Copy-
right Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 428-31 (2003) (discussing education and public
awareness programs).
129 See ACTA, supra note 2, art. 35.
130 See Yu, supra note 127, at 14 (noting that some preconditions are "are irrelevant, or at best
only marginally related, to intellectual property protection").
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negotiators in charge of developing international intellectual property and trade
agreements.
Sadly, until an enabling environment is created, it is unlikely that devel-
oping countries will offer stronger cross-border protection of intellectual proper-
ty rights. As Robert Sherwood reminded us in an aptly titled article, Some
Things Cannot Be Legislated, "until judicial systems in developing and transi-
tion countries are upgraded, it will matter little what intellectual property laws
and treaties provide.""' Likewise, Keith Maskus, Sean Dougherty, and Andrew
Mertha wrote:
Upgrading protection for IPRs alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for [the purpose of maximizing the competitive gains from additional innova-
tion and technology acquisition over time, with particular emphasis on raising
innovative activity by domestic entrepreneurs and enterprises]. Rather, the
system needs to be strengthened within a comprehensive and coherent set of
policy initiatives that optimize the effectiveness of IPRs. Among such initia-
tives are further structural reform of enterprises, trade and investment liberali-
zation, promotion of financial and innovation systems to commercialize new
technologies, expansion of educational opportunities to build human capital
for absorbing and developing technology, and specification of rules for main-
taining effective competition in Chinese markets.1
32
The need to develop this enabling environment was only recently ex-
plored in the fifth session of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement,
which sought to "[i]dentify[] elements for creating an enabling environment for
promoting respect for intellectual property in a sustainable manner and future
work." 33 As Pakistan reminded us in its submission:
[A] very limited approach to combating infringement of IP [intellectual prop-
erty] rights, in which, in essence, stricter laws and capacity building of en-
forcement agencies is seen as the primary means to ensure enforcement ...
can temporarily reduce IPR infringements levels, but cannot address the chal-
lenge in a sustainable manner. A broader strategy is urgently needed to allow
the establishment of conditions in which all countries would have shared un-
derstanding of the socio-economic implications of enforcement measures, and
direct economic interest in taking such measures. In such an environment,
131 Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & ComP. L.
37,42 (2002).
132 Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in China, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEvELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH
295, 297 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
1 WIPO, Advisory Comm. on Enforcement [ACE], Draft Agenda, item 7, WIPOIACE/51
Prov. Rev (Sept. 28, 2009).
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countries' choice to enforce IPRs will be derived from their internal rather
than external factors.IM
C. Principle 3: The Treaty Should Include All of the Major Parties
Whose Cooperation Is Needed to Solve the Problem
The third principle concerns the need to include countries whose coop-
eration is vital to addressing the problem. The problems with intellectual prop-
erty enforcement are as global as those related to illicit drug trafficking, refu-
gees, illegal immigration, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear
proliferation, terrorism, and corruption.' If an intellectual property enforce-
ment treaty is to be effective, it needs to include at least those countries that are
the major sources of piracy and counterfeiting."6 By using the ill-advised
134 Creating an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for IP: Concept Paper by Pakistan, 1 2,
in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, Annex 1, WIPO/ACE/5/11 (Nov. 4, 2009).
135 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 88, at 199 n.364. As Moisds Nafm wrote:
[I]llicit trade is a cross-border problem. And the only solution to a cross-
border problem is a cross-border solution. Which means that international co-
operation is imperative. These are unassailable facts based on simple logic.
They also have fiendishly difficult implications for action.
Working with others is never easy. Working with foreigners is even less so,
especially for governments. The arsenal of international treaties and conven-
tions that govern illicit trade function better to enshrine global standards than
to actually enable successful prosecution. Stories of international collabora-
tion undermined by corruption, noncompliance, or absence of trust litter the
headlines. But in the case of illicit trade, the alternative to international coop-
eration is to cede the field to the traffickers, who will find ways to penetrate
even those countries that invest the most in patrolling their borders. In other
words, the alternative is not an acceptable one.
NAIM, supra note 23, at 255; see also PmL~Ups, supra note 25, at 221 ("[Glovernments and
law enforcement need to create an international response to an international problem, or we
simply chase counterfeiters to where the law tolerates them."); Judith H. Bello, National So-
vereignty and Transnational Problem Solving, 18 CARDOzo L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1996)
("Many of the most difficult problems that challenge nation states in the increasingly inter-
dependent world do not respect borders . . .. Nation states acting alone are helpless to re-
solve or most effectively alleviate these problems.").
136 As Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal remind us:
[Tlhe core group of participants [using a plurilateral approach] must cover a
significant portion or scope of the problem to create collective benefits for the
group. In trade, as few as two parties can jointly benefit from a bilateral ar-
rangement; in arms control, the core group may have to include all potential
military players to be successful. A plurilateral arrangement on [interconti-
nental ballistic missiles] that did not include Russia would not accomplish
much.
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"country club" approach and ignoring important players such as Brazil, China,
India, and Russia, ACTA was doomed from the very beginning.
In fact, if the treaty is to be successful, it needs to provide other coun-
tries with a stake in the newly created regime. This is particularly important
considering the dynamic changes in the international intellectual property envi-
ronment. As I noted in the past:
A country's interest in setting new and higher international intellectual proper-
ty enforcement norms depends largely on the overall structure of the global in-
tellectual property system and the substantive benefits that country can derive
from reforming the system. As less developed countries continue to push for
greater protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions-and to
some extent, geographical indications-they eventually will reach a point
where the existing system will provide them with some attractive benefits. At
that point, they may begin to value the effective enforcement of intellectual
property rights as highly as their developed counterparts.137
Few countries are likely to take on more stringent international obliga-
tions unless doing so would be in their self-interest."' While the TRIPS Agree-
ment has raised the standards of enforcement of intellectual property rights-
albeit with limited success-it is important not to overlook the concessions de-
veloping countries have arguably received in areas such as agriculture and tex-
tiles.'39 As far as ACTA is concerned, it is unclear what side benefits develop-
ing countries will obtain." Although a better standing in the international
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL
PERSPECIVEs 50, 66 (Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004); see also Edith Brown
Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Bak-
er's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1555, 1578 (1999) ("[F]or obligations that involve
controlling trade across borders, it is important that countries on both sides of the border be
party to the relevant agreements.").
137 Yu, supra note 6, at 523-24; see also Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and
Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 433, 453 (2008) (discussing how "enforcement issues
may provide a promising opportunity for both developed and less-developed countries to
cooperate").
138 See Yu, supra note 137, at 453; Yu, supra note 6, at 523-24.
139 See Yu, supra note 5, at 371-73 (discussing the bargain narrative concerning the origins of
the TRIPS Agreement).
140 To date, countries continue to question whether the TRIPS Agreement represents a failed
bargain. See id. at 379 ("If one is to believe that the TRIPs Agreement is a compromise, em-
pirical records have indicated that less developed countries not only got a bad bargain, as
some would say, but also a failed bargain. Although developed countries promised to reduce
tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural and textile areas in exchange for stronger intellectual
property protection and wider market access, they failed to honor these promises."); see also
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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community could be considered a benefit, the past history of expansion of intel-
lectual property rights, and the United States' continued aggressive use of the
Section 301 process'41 have clearly shown that joining ACTA would not neces-
sarily improve a country's standing in the international community. 4 2  Nor
would it reduce the demands of developed country governments for stronger
intellectual property protection and enforcement. 43
D. Principle 4: The Treaty Should Not Cost More than Its Benefits
The final principle addresses the need to avoid negative spillover effects
in areas with competing public needs. While the easiest way to avoid spillover
effects is to draft the treaty as narrow and specific as possible, adopting a holis-
tic perspective in assessing the treaty's costs and benefits could also be quite
helpful. Such an approach would not only allow the policymakers to better as-
sess the agreement's full costs and benefits, but would also prevent the assess-
ment from being captured by those who would benefit directly from heightened
standards for intellectual property protection and enforcement.
To provide this holistic perspective, it is important to conduct impact
studies that go beyond a narrow focus on intellectual property protection.'"
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 8 (2002) (noting that many less developed countries "feel
that the commitments made by developed countries to liberalise agriculture and textiles and
reduce tariffs, have not been honoured, while they have to live with the burdens of the TRIPS
agreement"); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 173 (2003) (stating that "there is. . . no evidence that de-
veloped countries are making good on their commitments to open their markets more widely
to developing countries' agricultural and textile exports").
141 See generally Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the USTR, in MEDIA
PIRACY IN EMERGING GOODS, supra note 20, at 75 (critically evaluating the USTR's Section
301 process); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations
and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994) (discussing the operation of
the Section 301 process and its relation to U.S. trade negotiations).
142 See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2, at 1041-42.
143 To avoid unilateral trade sanctions from the United States, developing countries agreed to
establish the TRIPS Agreement. See Yu, supra note 5, at 372. Yet, the U.S. Trade Act stipu-
lates that the USTR can take Section 301 actions against countries that have failed to provide
"adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that
[they] may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(H) (2006) (emphasis
added).
1" See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 901 (2007) (not-
ing the need to "require impact studies before a further expansion of intellectual property
protection").
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This is particularly important considering the policymakers' tendency to focus
so much on compliance that they may miss the forest for the trees.'45 In recent
years, impact assessments have also been widely endorsed in the areas of human
rights, public health, and biological diversity.1" Assessment, evaluation, and
impact studies also constitute one of the six clusters of recommendations
adopted as part of the WIPO Development Agenda in October 2007.m
In addition, policymakers can take advantage of the institutional ar-
rangements that will help facilitate impact assessments across sectors, issue
areas, and disciplines. For example, Peter Drahos used the example of the Bra-
zilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to show the benefits of
coordination between patent offices and health and medical experts in assessing
145 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 242
(2009) ("TRIPS implementation in the OAPI [African Intellectual Property Organization]
countries was shaped by a pro-IP and 'compliance-plus'-oriented political environment.");
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods
and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 18
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (noting that many less developed coun-
tries are "compliance oriented").
146 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
(requiring contracting parties to "introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental
impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects
on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appro-
priate, allow for public participation in such procedures"); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone
to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scien-
tific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph
1(c), of the Covenant), 1 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) ("States parties
should .. . consider undertaking human rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and
after a period of implementation of legislation for the protection of the moral and material in-
terests resulting from one's scientific, literary or artistic productions."); WORLD HEALTH
ORG., COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC
HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2006) (stating that "[h]ealth
policies, as well as inter alia those addressing trade, the environment and commerce, should
be equally subject to assessments as to their impact on the right to health"); JAMES
HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 228 (2007)
("Systematic environmental assessments of trade agreements are relatively common. Nor-
way, the US and Canada all carry out reviews of the environmental impact of trade policies
which include some international impact assessment, as do the United Nations Environment
Programme and World Wildlife Fund.").
147 See 45 Adopted Recommendations, supra note 64 (outlining recommendations within the
assessment, evaluation, and impact studies cluster).
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an invention's contribution to innovation and health welfare.'4" As he explained,
health and medical experts are likely to be in a much better position than patent
examiners to make such an assessment.149
Drawing on Professor Drahos' well-illustrated example, I further sug-
gest that the ANIVSA model be used to facilitate greater cooperation between
intellectual property offices in the South and health and medical experts and
related nongovernmental organizations in the North.5 0 Sadly, despite the poten-
tial of the ANVISA model, the Brazilian government recently has greatly cur-
tailed the agency's efforts.'"' There are also political complications that create
an inevitable conflict between ANVISA and the Brazilian industrial property
148 See Peter Drahos, "Trust Me": Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
151, 169-70 (2008).
'49 Id. at 169-70. As he elaborated:
The Brazilian model is worth close study by other developing countries. It
is a preventive strategy that avoids the high costs of attempting to remove pa-
tents that have been granted. It is also an integrative regulatory strategy. It
links patentability criteria in the area of pharmaceuticals to the goal of wel-
fare-enhancing innovation in the health sector. One of the real concerns with
pharmaceutical patenting has been that patent offices are granting patents over
essentially trivial steps in the innovation process. The reasons for this are
complex, having to do with the incentives facing patent offices, the narrow
training of patent examiners, the fact that patent examiners are not research-
ers, and that they are not integrated into communities of public health experts
that know about what constitutes real innovation in a given field. From the
perspective of the patent social contract, the grant of patents over trivial or
obvious steps in the pharmaceutical innovation process constitutes a welfare
loss to society. Involving public health experts in the process of patent admin-
istration is one way of helping to ensure that the patent social contract func-
tions as it should in the health sector.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
1S0 See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. &
MED. 345, 378 (2008).
'5' See Felipe Carvalho, Brazil and the Defence of Public Health: Do as I Say, Not as I Do,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 2011/02/
17/brazil-and-the-defence-of-public-health-do-as-i-say-not-as-i-do/ (reporting the October
2010 decision of the Advocacia Geral da Unido that undermined ANVISA's prior consent
mechanism (anuincia privia)).
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agency (INPI).'152 As of this writing, it is unclear how effective ANVISA will
continue to be in the patent area.'53
In her recent book, Carolyn Deere Birkbeck also underscored the impor-
tance of institutional cooperation in the TRIPS context.'54 As she reminded us,
"governments with established processes for internal coordination . .. were best
able to resist external pressures and to advance a tailored approach to TRIPS
implementation."' Using India as an example, she wrote:
Among developing countries, India was the country with one of the longest
histories of internal coordination and, relative to other developing countries,
... stands out for its strategic and tailored approach to TRIPS implementation.
In India, the Ministry of Commerce has overall responsibility for WTO, in-
cluding TRIPS implementation. In 1997, a Coordinating Group of Secretaries
on all WTO matters was established by the Prime Minister and is chaired by
the Commerce Secretary. Starting in 1996/7, the Commerce Ministry initiated
one of the most comprehensive consultation processes among developing
countries on TRIPS, involving industry and trade organizations, NGOs [non-
governmental organizations], research and academic institutions, political par-
ties, and parliament. Consultations with NGOs and civil society were particu-
larly important in the process of designing India's Plant Variety Protection
and Farmers' Rights Act. In addition, the Commerce Minister constituted an
Advisory Committee on International Trade under his own chairmanship. The
Committee comprises industrialists, economists, NGO representatives, experts
from research institutions, and former public servants with an expertise in
WTO matters. This committee formed a subgroup to address TRIPS matters
and to consider specific issues and proposals for formulating India's positions
in the WTO.'
To ensure that the treaty's benefits exceed its costs, a new intellectual
property enforcement treaty should include provisions accommodating adjust-
ments based on impact studies while facilitating institutional cooperation across
sectors and involving multiple agencies. For example, the agreement could in-
clude exceptions that allow for adjustments based on impact assessments con-
ducted before the implementation of new standards. The agreement could also
152 For discussions of this conflict, see generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Political Contradic-
tions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil,
39 POL. & Soc'Y 143 (2011); Kenneth C. Shadlen The Rise and Fall of "Prior Consent" in
Brazil, 3 WIPO J. 103 (2011) [hereinafter Shadlen, Rise and Fall].
153 See Shadlen, Rise and Fall, supra note 152, at 108 ("In fact, as of mid-2011 prior consent
appears, for all practical purposes, to be dead.").
IS4 See DEERE, supra note 145, at 211-14 (discussing international government coordination in
making intellectual property decisions).
5 Id. at 213.
156 Id.
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require alternative or follow up assessments after a specified period following
such implementation.' For developing countries that do not have the needed
capacity or infrastructure to undertake impact assessments, the agreement could
further facilitate the development of a mechanism or infrastructure to help them
undertake these much-needed studies."
In addition, the agreement could help facilitate the development of
cross-sectoral institutional cooperation-for example, through the establishment
of taskforces and working groups.' Exemplifying such development is the
1995 U.S.-China Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights."o To ef-
fectively respond to the fragmentary bureaucratic structures in China, this
Agreement included an action plan that introduced a new enforcement structure
known as the State Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property
Rights.16 ' This working conference was responsible for the central organization
and coordination of protection and enforcement of all intellectual property laws
throughout China.'62
1 Cf. HARRISON, supra note 146, at 229 ("The EU methodology ... contains provisions requir-
ing 'ex post monitoring, evaluation and follow up of trade agreements' so that ongoing im-
pacts of trade agreements can be evaluated once the agreement in question is actually in
force."). It is worth noting that ex post reviews tend to be less effective than ex ante reviews.
See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 777, 799-
801 (2010) (criticizing the EU ex post evaluation of its Database Directive and distributing
recommendations based on such an evaluation); see also James Boyle, Two Database Cheers
for the EU, FIN. TIMEs (Jan. 2, 2006, 5:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-
1 lda-ab8e-0000779e2340.html (discussing the European Commission's first report on the
Directive).
158 See HARRISON, supra note 146, at 234 ("[Dleveloping countries may not have the capacity or
infrastructure to undertake assessments by themselves.").
159 See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Devel-
oping Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REv. 1115, 1117 (2009) (arguing that "inter-
nal governmental coordination of intellectual property policy would be crucial to formulating
appropriate domestic strategies to implement international intellectual property standards un-
der the TRIPS Agreement" (citing unpublished UNDP study by Ruth Okediji, Jerome
Reichman, and Jayasharee Watal)).
160 Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in
Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, China-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881
(1995).
16, See id. § IA.
162 -Tis Working Conference was designed specially to target local protectionism and the vul-
nerability of the Chinese judicial system to that problem." Yu, From Pirates to Partners, su-
pra note 88, at 147.
52 IDEA 3 (2012)
Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?
IV. ALTERNATiVE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
The development of both the TRIPS Agreement and ACTA has shown
that treaties have been embraced as the preferred approach to strengthening
global enforcement of intellectual property rights. Part III offers four guidelines
policymakers can use to strengthen the treaty-based approach. This Part empha-
sizes that the treaty-based approach is not the only option for developed coun-
tries and their intellectual property industries to strengthen intellectual property
enforcement. It discusses, in turn, four alternative strategies that can be used as
either complements or substitutes.
A. Economic Assistance
The first strategy concerns the use of economic assistance. Over the
years, commentators have advanced a number of proposals to facilitate the pro-
vision of economic assistance. 63 In a paper written before he became WIPO's
first ever chief economist, Carsten Fink called on either developed country gov-
ernments or intellectual property rights holders to bear the costs of intellectual
property enforcement in developing countries.' As he explained:
Since developed country firms derive a direct benefit from stronger IPRs en-
forcement, it may be in the interest of their governments to subsidize IPRs en-
forcement activities in developing countries. Thus, the question of whether
stepped-up IPRs enforcement in less developed countries should not be fi-
nanced by developed country governments is a matter for reflection.
Another approach would be to have enforcement costs borne directly by pri-
vate rights holders. Arguably, at least some consumers benefit from stronger
enforcement action and should therefore share the costs of the public good
represented by law enforcement activities. However, private rights holders
are the most direct beneficiary of better enforcement and they can therefore be
expected to make a substantial contribution to the financing of underlying
costs.165
Likewise, Mark Liang, in a recently published student comment, sug-
gested the need to create an "IPR Enforcement Fund" that draws on the WTO's
annual membership dues.'" According to him:
163 See, e.g., Fink, supra note 20, at 19; Mark Liang, A Three-Pronged Approach: How the
United States Can Use WTO Disclosure Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property In-
fringement in China, 11 Cm. J. INT'L L. 285, 300-02 (2010).
16 Fink, supra note 20, at 19.
'0 Id. at xvi.
'6 Liang, supra note 163, at 300.
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The WTO could require member states to pay into an "IPR enforcement fund"
through annual membership fees. The fund's proceeds would then be distri-
buted to China and other member states that have poor IPR enforcement
records. The distribution of funds would be conditioned on their use for IPR
enforcement purposes. For example, the money could be used for increasing
seizure and confiscation efforts, hiring and training judicial and administrative
agency personnel to handle IPR cases, and defraying the costs of judicial and
administrative proceedings.'6 7
Liang's proposal builds on not only the technical and financial assistance obli-
gations of the WTO and under the TRIPS Agreement, but also the
GATT/WTO's longstanding practice of providing such assistance.' 8
Both proposals seek to target the resource and capacity constraints in
developing countries. On the surface, they resemble the age-old demands for
transfer of wealth from the haves to the have-nots-demands of which policy-
makers and rights holders in developed countries are arguably tired. In reality,
however, these proposals are quite innovative. By facilitating the development
of a win-win solution-through which beneficiaries provide financial support to
improve the global intellectual property system-the proposals help sustain im-
provements that are likely to benefit both developed and developing countries.
Moreover, if the system draws financial support from rights holders
alone, as opposed to developed country governments, the heavy burden on de-
veloped countries will be greatly reduced in the long run. As the innovative
capacities in developing countries increase, and as more intellectual property
rights holders emerge in these once poor countries, rights holders in developing
countries will pick up their share of the burden of improving the intellectual
property system. Because the burden of support in this system does not always
rest on rights holders from developed countries, the system is likely to be consi-
dered fairer.'"
167 Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
168 See id. at 301-02.
169 Daniel Chow went even further to argue that multinational corporations ("MNCs") "bear
ethical and financial responsibility for the unprecedented rise in the global trade in counter-
feit goods and that they should bear some of the costs of compensating for the harms that are
caused by them." Chow, supra note 20, at 792. As he explained:
MNCs are often portrayed as the victims of counterfeiting, but they actually
contribute significantly to creating the problem that harms developing coun-
tries. MNCs are responsible because counterfeiting is a predictable result of
moving manufacturing and production to developing countries in order to take
advantage of low labor and manufacturing costs. As part of establishing man-
ufacturing facilities in developing countries, MNCs transfer commercially
valuable intellectual property rights to developing countries with weak legal
systems and corrupt governments. By introducing commercially valuable in-
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B. Technical Assistance
The second strategy concerns the provision of technical assistance. The
language for providing such assistance is already stipulated in the TRIPS
Agreement. For example, Article 66.2 states that "[dleveloped country Mem-
bers shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and via-
ble technological base."7 0 Article 67 further requires developed country mem-
bers to "provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, tech-
nical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed
country Members.""' As stated in the provision:
tellectual property rights that are easily copied in countries where corruption
and crime are rampant and enforcement is weak, MNCs are providing an op-
portunity for lucrative economic crimes that prove impossible to resist for
many segments of the poor population in developing countries. MNCs are al-
so making the problem worse because their anti-counterfeiting strategies
(which concentrate exclusively on enforcement) actually have the opposite ef-
fect of provoking a frenzy of even more counterfeiting at ever-increasing le-
vels. As long as MNCs benefit from low-cost manufacturing in developing
countries that involve the transfer of technology to those countries, global
trade in counterfeit goods will continue to grow because the bulk of the harms
of counterfeiting are corporate externalities for MNCs.
Id. at 790-91.
170 TRIPS Agreement art. 66.
171 Id. art. 67. Nevertheless, Duncan Matthews and Viviana Mufioz-Tellez noted the limitations
of this provision:
First, by requiring developing countries to request assistance from developed
country WTO members, and by requiring the providers and recipients of tech-
nical assistance to agree mutually on terms and conditions, there is a risk that
Article 67 perpetuates a dependency culture. IP-related technical assistance
subsequently provided by developed countries may be inappropriate for spe-
cific country conditions. Secondly, by making explicit reference to the fact
that technical cooperation under Article 67 "shall include" the provision of as-
sistance associated with the protection and enforcement of intellectual rights,
article 67 fails to place an explicit obligation on developed nations to assist
developing countries in utilizing TRIPS flexibilities such as those in relation
to compulsory licensing that could help to ensure access to medicines. Nei-
ther does article 67 place an obligation on developed country members to as-
sist developing countries with respect to articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS.
Duncan Matthews & Viviana Muiioz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The
United States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 632 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Volume 52 - Number 3
278 IDEA-The Intellectual Property Law Review
Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regu-
lations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as
well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding
the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant
to these matters, including the training of personnel.17 2
Sadly, despite the explicit language in these provisions and the WTO's
recent affirmation of the mandatory nature of the technology transfer obligations
under Article 66.2,173 developed countries thus far have only paid lip service to
these obligations, with some undoubtedly subscribing to the view that these
obligations are merely aspirational.174 To be fair, many developed countries,
industry groups, and international donor organizations have actively provided
technical assistance programs.' 7 ' However, many of these programs are narrow-
ly conceived, and they tend to ignore the divergent local conditions in develop-
ing countries. Equally questionable is the effectiveness of these programs in
helping to build local capacity, as opposed to adopting standards preferred by
those providing assistance.
As far as ACTA is concerned, commentators have already expressed
fears that technical assistance "experts" will present ACTA as a template for
best practices-or even the gold standard-for intellectual property enforce-
ment." 6 Given the Agreement's many design flaws, the use of such a template
may further dissuade developing countries from introducing limitations or ex-
ceptions that would otherwise be desirable under the local conditions."' Such
172 TRIPS Agreement art. 67.
173 Paragraph 11.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of November 14, 2001, which covers im-
plementation-related issues and concerns, states: "[T]he provisions of Article 66.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement are mandatory." World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 14
November 2001, 11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001). The decision further required the
TRIPS Council to "put in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full implemen-
tation of the obligations in question." Id.
174 See Yu, supra note 6, at 526.
175 See generally CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION:
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 61-66 (2007) (discussing WIPO's technical
assistance and capacity-building efforts); CAROLYN DEERE BIRKBECK & SANTIAGO ROCA, AN
EXTERNAL REVIEW OF WIPO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE AREA OF COOPERATION FOR
DEVELOPMENT (2011) (reviewing WIPO's technical assistance activities in the area of coop-
eration for development); Matthews & Mufioz-Tellez, supra note 171 (discussing bilateral
technical assistance efforts).
176 See generally Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 2 (criticizing the many flaws in ACTA).
"' See id. at 1040-44.
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curtailment is particularly disturbing considering the many permissible limita-
tions, exceptions, and flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement."
C. Empowerment of Local Stakeholders
The third strategy concerns the empowerment of local stakeholders
through sector-based collaboration at the non-state level-for example, among
intellectual property rights holders or their representative trade groups. Most
accounts of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement focus on state driven develop-
ments."' However, those accounts are often incomplete."o As Susan Sell
pointed out:
State-centric accounts of the Uruguay Round are at best incomplete, and at
worst misleading, as they obscure the driving forces behind the TRIPS
Agreement .... In the TRIPS case, private actors pursued their interests
through multiple channels and struck bargains with multiple actors: domestic
interindustry counterparts, domestic governments, foreign governments, for-
eign private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign industry associations,
and international organizations. They vigorously pursued their IP objectives
at all possible levels and in multiple venues, successfully redefining intellec-
tual property as a trade issue .... It was not merely their relative economic
power that led to their ultimate success, but their command of IP expertise,
their ideas, their information, and their framing skills (translating complex is-
sues into political discourse).' 8'
Like the development of the TRIPS Agreement, the enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights involves not only state governments, but also sub-state
and non-state actors.'82 The fourth recital of the preamble to the TRIPS Agree-
ment explicitly "recogniz[es] that intellectual property rights are private
178 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 744-47 (discussing
the importance of minimum standards in the TRIPS Agreement).
179 See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
3-27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS Agreement);
WATAL, supra note 11, at 11-47 (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS Agree-
ment); Yu, supra note 5, at 371-79 (examining four different accounts of the origins of the
TRIPS Agreement).
180 See Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2012).
181 SELL, supra note 140, at 8.
182 See NAIM, supra note 23, at 242 ("Antitrafficking strategies based on government action
alone are doomed to founder on government's inherent limitations-national frontiers and
bureaucratic processes-that traffickers have so adeptly turned to their advantage. And if
governments can't curb illicit trade within their own borders alone, it follows that they can't
do it beyond their borders, either.").
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rights."' Although there recently have been growing efforts to shift enforce-
ment costs from private rights holders to the public sector-through ACTA and
other nonmultilateral agreements'"-successful enforcement often requires the
cooperation of both private rights holders and public enforcement authorities.
As Gregor Urbas reminded us, "[slignificant public/private sector interaction is
often required at the investigation stage for the identification of pirated or coun-
terfeit goods, and similarly for the collection and presentation of appropriate
evidence in any subsequent criminal prosecution."' Likewise, Timothy Trainer
and Vicki Allums, the authors of a leading treatise on cross-border intellectual
property enforcement, wrote: "the role of industry, i.e., the IPR owners, their
legal counsel, and investigators, is critical to any degree of effective enforce-
ment at the border."'86
Given the important roles rights holders will have to play in the intellec-
tual property enforcement system, greater cross-border collaboration among
stakeholders at the non-state level is needed to supplement the state-based en-
forcement regime. As I previously highlighted, the creation of local stakehold-
ers is of paramount importance:
Policymakers need to help the nonstakeholders develop a stake in the system
and understand how they can protect their products and receive royalties. For
example, they need to help the nonstakeholders develop their own industry,
such as a software industry or a recording industry. By doing so, they will be
able to transform the nonstakeholders into stakeholders or potential stakehold-
ers.
So far, companies in less developed countries are reluctant to protect intel-
lectual property rights of their foreign joint venture partners, because they
have a limited understanding of intellectual property and are suspicious of the
intentions behind what their foreign partners are attempting to do. Once they
183 TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
18 See Li, supra note 20, at 28 ("[Rlesponsibility of enforcement has cost implications ....
[B]y shifting responsibility, it would shift the cost of enforcement from private parties to the
government and ensure right-holders are beneficiaries without asking responsibility."); Hen-
ning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Re-Delineation of the Role of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond
Exclusive Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 43, 51-52
(noting the trend of "externalizing the risks and resources to enforce IP rights away from the
originally responsible rights-holders towards state authorities"); Yu, supra note 6, at 488
("While, in the past, private rights holders funded enforcement costs through civil litigation,
the growing demands for criminalization and public enforcement have led to a gradual shift
of responsibility from private rights holders to national governments.").
185 Gregor Urbas, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Interaction Between
Public Authorities and Private Interests, in NEW FRONTIERS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 303, 303 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2005).
186 TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 19, at 24.
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learn more about intellectual property and understand their stakes within the
copyright system, they will change their perception and position.'87
To empower local stakeholders, one could, for example, take advantage
of the collaboration among trade groups lying across the border. The coopera-
tion between the Recording Industry Association of America (or the Interna-
tional Federation of the Phonographic Industry) and the Music Copyright Socie-
ty of China provides a good example.'" Countries could also consider bringing
together judges and members of other epistemic communities to collaborate
with each other.'89 Although state governments would be involved, the focus of
these efforts, in many cases, is the transnational cooperation at the sub-state
level.
These cooperation efforts compare favorably against the widely criti-
cized approaches of powerful developed countries, which rely heavily on for-
eign pressure to induce developing countries to offer stronger protection and
187 Yu, supra note 128, at 431.
188 Established in December 1992, the Music Copyright Society of China represents Chinese
singers, composers, music adaptors, heirs, music publishers, and recording companies of
Chinese nationality. See CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS 63 (2004). By the mid-2000s, it already had more than 2,500 members.
189 See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (1998) (noting that epistemic communities "are valuable for
their enormous pools of information and their capacities to acquire and generate more");
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004) (discussing the interactions
of judges in a transnational network); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 88, at 219-
20 ("The United States can . . . improve the professionalism of the legal workers in China by
encouraging them to create professional associations and to become members of national and
transnational epistemic communities."). As Yang Tseming noted in the environmental law
context:
Epistemic communities have been especially influential with respect to in-
ternational environmental issues. They are "networks of professionals [such
as scientists,] with recognized expertise[,] competence[,] and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within (the] issue-area." Because under-
standing and addressing environmental problems such as stratospheric ozone
depletion and global climate change requires technical and scientific expertise,
epistemic communities have had a dominant role in shaping the perception of
reality, framing issues, and identifying national environmental interests. For
example, the advocacy work of atmospheric scientists and environmentalists
in large part drove the adoption of the ozone treaties and the phase-out of
CFCs.
Yang Tseming, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent
Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1131, 1147
(2006) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epis-
temic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992)).
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enforcement of intellectual property rights.'90 Historical experience has shown
that external influence has its limits.' How successful this influence will be
depends ultimately on the relative strength of the players exerting influence
from the outside. As countries targeted with external pressure become more
powerful, such as today's China, the likelihood of success in using an outside-in
approach will be greatly reduced.
D. Do Nothing
Finally, doing nothing (or waiting) could be an alternative strategy.
Counterintuitive as it may sound, this strategy is well supported by historical
precedents. In the past, countries have migrated slowly from pirating nations to
ones respectful of intellectual property rights as they become more economical-
ly developed.'92 Thus, it is not entirely far-fetched to assume that intellectual
property problems can slowly evolve away, if rights holders and their supportive
nations can wait patiently for such an evolution.
A case in point is the United States, which has migrated "from pirate to
holdout to enforcer" in less than two centuries.' In the late eighteenth and ear-
ly nineteenth centuries, the United States was one of the world's biggest pirating
nations, creating frustration for both British and French authors." As Charles
Dickens recounted in frustration on his unsuccessful trip to America:
I spoke, as you know, of international copyright, at Boston; and I spoke of it
again at Hartford. My friends were paralysed with wonder at such audacious
daring. The notion that I, a man alone by himself, in America, should venture
to suggest to the Americans that there was one point on which they were nei-
ther just to their own countrymen nor to us, actually struck the boldest
dumb! . . . It is nothing that of all men living I am the greatest loser by it. It is
nothing that I have to claim to speak and be heard. The wonder is that a
breathing man can be found with temerity enough to suggest to the Americans
the possibility of their having done wrong. I wish you could have seen the
faces that I saw, down both sides of the table at Hartford, when I began to talk
about [Sir Walter] Scott. I wish you could have heard how I gave it out. My
190 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 88, at 136-51 (tracing the United States' coer-
cive intellectual property policy toward China during the 1980s and early 1990s).
19' See id. at 140-48 (discussing the limited effectiveness of the United States' coercive intellec-
tual property policy toward China).
192 See Yu, supra note 127, at 10-15 (discussing the crossover point).
193 Id. (capitalization omitted).
19 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 88, at 225.
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blood so boiled as I thought of the monstrous injustice that I felt as if I were
twelve feet high when I thrust it down their throats. 9 5
Notwithstanding Dickens' frustration-and similar complaints by An-
thony Trollope, Gilbert and Sullivan, and many others-the attitudes toward
protection of foreign authors in the United States soon improved with the arrival
of a group of new stakeholders-budding American authors such as James Fe-
nimore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Washington Irv-
ing, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Herman Melville, Edgar Allan Poe, Harriet
Beecher Stowe, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman." Today, the United
States is an uncontested champion of intellectual property rights throughout the
world.
If experiences from countries like the United States, Germany, Japan,
Singapore, and South Korea can be generalized, developing countries are likely
to experience a similar crossover in the near future. Indeed, one can already
find promising signs of this crossover in large middle income countries, such as
Brazil, China, and India. It is only a matter of time before these countries reach
a crossover point where stronger protection will be in their self-interest."
Nevertheless, it is fair to question whether developed countries and their
intellectual property industries would have enough patience to wait. Even if
economists could accurately show that these large middle income countries
would consider it to be in their self-interest to provide satisfactory levels of in-
tellectual property protection and enforcement in two decades, it is very doubt-
ful that developed countries and their supportive industries would be content
with this empirically grounded answer.'" Thus, this final strategy alone is likely
to be considered unsatisfactory for many intellectual property rights holders.
V. CONCLUSION
For as long as intellectual property rights have existed, the enforcement
of these rights has been a challenge at both the domestic and international le-
vels. It is therefore no surprise that some commentators have joked about how
19 Letter from Charles Dickens to John Foster (Feb. 24, 1842), reprinted in Hamish R. Sandi-
son, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American Expe-
rience, 11 COLUMBIA-VLA J. L. & ARTS 89, 92 (1986).
16 See Yu, supra note 128, at 344.
19 See Yu, supra note 150, at 391; Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 88, at 202.
198 Nevertheless, it is comforting to note the positive implications of this historical development.
Even if all the existing efforts to strengthen intellectual property enforcement failed, the
problems would not necessarily become much worse. In fact, the improvements in the eco-
nomic and technological conditions may provide the much-needed correction mechanism.
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intellectual property lawyers are the "second-oldest profession," younger than
only pirates and counterfeiters.'9" Yet, despite all the demands for greater en-
forcement of intellectual property rights, policymakers, industry representatives,
and commentators have yet to develop an appropriate intellectual property en-
forcement treaty to target the crux of the enforcement problems. While both the
TRIPS Agreement and the recently adopted ACTA have included a considerable
number of intellectual property enforcement provisions, their effectiveness is
highly questionable.
If policymakers are to provide more meaningful protection to intellec-
tual property rights holders, they need to pay greater attention to treaty design.
This Lecture has articulated four commonsensical and easy-to-follow guidelines
to help them strengthen the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights at both the domestic and international levels. It has further identified four
alternative strategies that can be used to complement or substitute the develop-
ment of intellectual property enforcement treaties. Hopefully, these principles
and strategies will be adopted in the future to help ensure more effective en-
forcement of intellectual property rights.
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